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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates how geographical proximity moderates the nonmonotonic relation 
between niche overlap and the propensity of organizations to collaborate. The main 
prediction is that the strength of this relation is different for organizations with low versus 
high levels of geographical proximity. Proposed hypotheses are tested by using data 
collected within a community of hospital organizations serving more than five million 
residents in one of the largest Italian geographical regions. After controlling for internal 
resource complementarities and differences in organizational forms, behavioural 
orientations and institutional constraints among hospitals, this paper finds strong empirical 
support to the research hypotheses.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Organizations establish network ties in order to access complementary or critical resources beyond 
their control (GULATI and GARGIULO, 1999), to learn from the experience of relevant others 
(BECKMAN and HAUNSCHILD, 2002), to share production costs and exploit economies of scale 
(GUGLAR and DUNNING, 1993), to boost innovation (e.g. AHUJA, 2000), to strengthen their 
legitimacy (STUART et al., 1999) and to improve their performance (BAUM et al., 2010). 
Different mechanisms have been proposed to explain the formation of collaborative network ties 
between organizations (GULATI, 1995; LAUMANN and MARSDEN, 1982; SORENSON and 
STUART, 2008). In particular, similarities and differences in resource requirements, dependencies 
and constraints are the most common explanations for differences in the propensity of organizations 
to establish collaborative relations (GULATI and GARGIULO, 1999; PFEFFER, 1985).  
 The concept of ‘organizational niche’ has been used in ecological theory to describe how 
market opportunities and constraints vary between organizations as functions of their 
environmental dependence patterns (INGRAM and QINGYUAN YUE, 2008; HANNAN and 
FREEMAN, 1989). The term ‘niche overlap’ has been coined specifically to characterize similarity 
in resource dependencies that organizations exhibit in their environment (BURT and TALMUD, 
1993).  
 The propensity of organizations to establish collaborative relations has been posited to be 
a nonlinear function of niche overlap (PODOLNY et al., 1996). According to this argument, the 
propensity to collaborate is controlled by two opposing forces: opportunity for cooperation and 
rivalry. Opportunity for cooperation increases with niche overlap, because organizations that 
depend on similar resources tend to become more similar as they conform to the expectations 
expressed by similar audiences (DIMAGGIO and POWELL, 1983; ZUCKERMAN, 1999, 2000). 
Organizations that are more similar along relevant structural and behavioural dimensions might 
find it easier to exchange resources and information, and to coordinate their operations and plans 
(POWELL et al., 2005; STUART, 1998). However, rivalry also increases with niche overlap, 
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because similarities in patterns of resource dependence will elicit and intensify competitive 
interdependencies between organizations (BAUM and HAVEMAN, 1997; FREEMAN and 
HANNAN, 1983). As a result, the effect of niche overlap on the propensity of organizations to 
collaborate is not linear (ALTER and HAGE, 1993; TRAPIDO, 2007).  
 Despite a general agreement on the nonmonotonic relation between niche overlap and the 
propensity of organizations to collaborate, scant knowledge exists about the effect of geographical 
proximity on this relationship. The present paper is aimed to fill this gap in the literature by 
exploring whether and how geographical proximity moderates the effect of organizations’ niche 
overlap on their propensity to collaborate. More specifically, assuming that niche overlap has an 
inverted U-shaped effect on the propensity to collaborate, this paper hypothesizes that the strength 
and shape of this effect will be different for organizations with low versus high levels of 
geographical proximity. Tension between competitive and collaborative triggers will be higher 
when geographical proximity is high (i.e. physical distance is low), thus decreasing the net effect 
of niche overlap on the overall propensity to collaborate. On the other hand, when geographical 
proximity is low (i.e. physical distance is high), niche overlap is likely to be more clearly and 
positively associated with propensity to collaborate, albeit at a decreasing rate.  
 The present paper empirically addresses this argument by considering data on patient-
transfer relations collected within a community of hospital organizations serving more than five 
million residents in one of the largest Italian geographical regions. As with most organizations, 
hospitals face multiple audiences, or sets of agents who control access to symbolic and material 
resources affecting organizational performance and, ultimately, survival (HANNAN, PÓLOS and 
CARROLL, 2007). One audience of particular relevance for hospitals is patients, whose 
expectations are used to evaluate the quality of healthcare services. Patient transfers require high 
levels of coordination and communication between partner hospitals. For this reason, this paper 
treats the presence of patient transfer relations as the observable counterpart of the latent propensity 
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of hospitals to collaborate via the creation of network ties (LEE et al., 2011; IWASHYNA et al., 
2009; LOMI and PALLOTTI, 2012).  
 Hospitals provide an almost ideal setting to conduct this research, for two main reasons. 
First, competition and collaboration are particularly meaningful processes for hospitals, which 
operate in technical and institutional environments that affect collaborative and competitive 
dynamics (RUEF and SCOTT, 1998; SCOTT and MEYER, 1991[1983]). Second, a wave of 
reforms implemented in many Western healthcare systems (COSTA-FONT and RICO, 2006; 
ROSS and TOMANEY, 2001) stressed competitive forces, potentially altering the collaboration-
competition interorganizational scenario (BARRETTA, 2008; LOMI and PALLOTTI, 2012; 
MASCIA and DI VINCENZO, 2011; MASCIA et al., 2012).  
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. After discussing the theoretical background, 
the next section proposes hypotheses about the relation between niche overlap and the propensity 
of organizations to collaborate, and the moderating role of geographical proximity in this relation. 
The third section provides information on the research design and the model specification and 
estimation. The fourth section presents results of the empirical analysis. A final discussion section 
concludes the paper. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Niche overlap and the propensity to collaborate 
Contemporary organizational theories converge on the view that collaborative opportunities and 
competitive constraints depend on the position that organizations occupy in relevant resource 
spaces (BURT, 1992; DOBREV et al., 2001; HANNAN and FREEMAN, 1989). The main 
theoretical construct employed to capture this position is the ‘organizational niche’, which refers to 
the position that an organization occupies in a multidimensional space of environmental resources 
(HANNAN and FREEMAN, 1989). Organizations differ in their resource dependence patterns; 
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thus, organizational niches may be defined with reference to different resource dependencies 
(PODOLNY et al., 1996). 
 The niche concept has proven insightful in the study of various organizational 
communities, ranging from day-care centres (BAUM and SINGH, 1994) to automobile 
manufacturers (DOBREV et al., 2001), investment banks (PARK and PODOLNY, 2000) and 
semiconductor producers (PODOLNY et al., 1996). Of particular relevance to this paper is the 
application of the niche concept to hospital organizations (SOHN, 2001; 2002). The notion of 
organizational niche is frequently used to summarize the link between environmental dependencies 
and competitive conditions (POPIELARZ and NEAL, 2007). Two organizations compete to the 
extent that they rely on the same resources (i.e. that their niches overlap) (BAUM and SINGH, 
1994; BURT and TALMUD, 1993). 
 Extant theories of organization seem to agree only partially about the precise implications 
of niche overlap for interorganizational collaborative relations (INGRAM and QINGYUAN YUE, 
2008). A first theoretical vision suggests that niche overlap increases competitive constraints 
(BAUM and HAVEMAN, 1997; FREEMAN and HANNAN, 1983). According to this perspective, 
the more two organizations depend on similar resources, the more intense their rivalry will be 
(ALDRICH and RUEF, 2006; BAUM and SHIPILOV, 2006). As competition erodes social ties 
(BURT, 1992), the propensity of rival organizations to collaborate will be lower. Studies of 
organizational founding, mortality, growth and internal activities (BAUM and SINGH, 1994; 
PODOLNY et al., 1996; POPIELARZ and MCPHERSON, 1995) have consistently reported 
empirical evidence of a positive relation between niche overlap and rivalry.  
 An alternative vision builds on the observation that organizations which depend on similar 
resources will tend to become more similar in their structure, climate and behavioural focus (DI 
MAGGIO and POWELL, 1983). Organizations whose access to material and symbolic resources 
depends on evaluations by the same audience will adjust their structures and behavioural 
orientations to conform to the audience’s expectations (ZUCKERMAN, 1999, 2000). However, 
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organizations that are more similar along relevant structural and behavioural dimensions might find 
it easier, rather than more difficult, to exchange resources and information (INGRAM and RAO, 
2004; TRAPIDO, 2007). This principle of interorganizational attachment based on homophily has 
received considerable support from empirical studies of interorganizational relations (BAKER and 
FAULKNER, 1993; PODOLNY, 1994; POWELL et al., 2005; STUART, 1998). Coordination, 
knowledge transfer, information sharing and the capacity to absorb knowledge become easier to 
manage as the similarity of potential partners increases (COHEN and LEVINTHAL, 1990; 
REAGANS and MCEVILY, 2003).  
 A compounded consideration of the abovementioned contrasting viewpoints envisages a 
complex, nonlinear relation between niche overlap and the propensity of organizations to 
collaborate. As similarities in their resource constraints increase, organizations will tend to become 
more aware of each other (WHITE, 1981), and their abilities to collaborate, benefit and learn from 
each other will increase (COHEN and LEVINTHAL, 1990). However, similarities in resource 
dependence profiles among niche residents will increase the potential for competition 
(MCPHERSON, 1983). If organizational niches overlap completely, then the potential for 
competition will be fierce; if they do not overlap at all, then there will be no potential for 
competition, as the organizations will require entirely different resources (BAUM and 
HAVEMAN, 1997). Studies have produced direct evidence that overlapping resource dependencies 
increase the propensity to cooperate among potentially competing organizations through a 
nonlinear effect. In their analysis of Web-based data for 225 U.S. colleges and universities, Kovács 
and Macy (2008) reported that interorganizational similarity increases the probability of observing 
a link between web pages. After such point, the effect of similarity switches from cooperative to 
competitive with the consequence of reducing the likelihood of observing web links between 
universities that are too similar. The main qualitative implication of their study is that the 
possibilities of interorganizational connections are precluded only at very high levels of similarity.  
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 In summary, opportunities for collaboration and competition vary as functions of similarity 
in resource dependencies. As similarity increases, organizations will exhibit an increased 
propensity to collaborate, although at a decreasing rate. However, as similarity increases 
organizations will be more likely to compete for the same resources, and the competitive pressure 
will increase at an increasing rate. In the limit where two organizations rely on exactly the same 
resources, competition will be unavoidable. This argument suggests an inverted U-shaped relation 
between niche overlap and the propensity of organizations to collaborate. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1. Niche overlap has an inverted U-shaped effect on the propensity of organizations to 
collaborate. At low levels of niche overlap, the effect of opportunities for collaboration dominates 
the effect of competition, making interorganizational collaboration more likely. At high levels of 
niche overlap, the strength of competitive constraints becomes progressively dominant, thus 
reducing the propensity of organizations to collaborate. 
 
The moderating effect of geographical proximity 
The likelihood of observing interorganizational exchange relations is strongly influenced by the 
geographical proximity of potential partners (AUDRETSCH and FELDMAN, 1996; BALLAND, 
2012; BOSCHMA and FRENKEN, 2010; BROEKEL and BOSCHMA, 2012; GERTLER, 2003; 
KNOBEN and OERLEMANS, 2012; SORENSON and STUART, 2008; TER WAL, 2014). 
However, answers to many related questions have remained elusive. For example, how does the 
geographical distance between organizations influence the effects of niche overlap on their 
propensity to collaborate? And, to what extent does geographical proximity modify the degree of 
attraction or repulsion between organizations with similar resource requirements?  
 Geographical proximity – intended here as spatial vicinity between actors (BALLAND, 
2012; TORRE and GILLY, 2000) – likely moderates the effects of niche overlap on the formation 
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of interorganizational relations for several reasons. First, proximity can influence the propensity of 
organizations to benefit from coordination and resource exchange (BALLAND, 2012). Knowledge 
transfer between organizations, for example, is strongly conditioned by the organizations’ spatial 
proximity, especially for tacit knowledge involving organizational routines (GERTLER, 2003; 
HOWELLS, 2002; MASKELL and MALMBERG, 1999). Furthermore, geographical distance 
introduces higher coordination costs related to the management of long-distance activities, as well 
as costs aimed at contrasting opportunistic behaviours that are more likely when organizations are 
located far apart (BOSCHMA, 2005; CUMMINGS and KIESLER, 2007). Given a certain degree 
of similarity in their resource dependence profiles, distant partners are more likely to sustain higher 
coordination costs and to face difficulties in knowledge transfer and exchange.  
 Nevertheless, engaging in interorganizational relations with distant partners also entails 
advantages. Geographical distance may reduce organizations’ competitive constraints, because 
firms with the same degree of resource similarity but located further apart will likely cater to 
different sets of customers and, hence, experience less fierce rivalry (e.g. POUDER and JOHN, 
1996). This description is true for hospital services, whose demand is geographically determined 
(GOWRISANKARAN and TOWN, 2003; KESSLER and MCCLELLAN, 2000; WONG et al., 
2005). Moreover, collaborative ties across wide geographical boundaries are likely to fuel a greater 
variety of knowledge than local linkages, thus enhancing the learning potential of such relations 
(OWEN-SMITH and POWELL, 2004; ZAHEER and GEORGE, 2004). Finally, ties between 
proximal firms may be redundant with respect to other channels of knowledge access (DAHL and 
PEDERSEN, 2004; MCCANN and SIMONEN, 2005; SAXENIAN, 1994). Hence, the need for 
formal ties to co-located partners is often less compelling (ANGELI et al., 2013; CORREDOIRA 
and ROSENKOPF, 2010). When too embedded, local collaborative networks may even be harmful 
(BROEKEL and BOSCHMA, 2012; UZZI, 1997).  
 Compounding these arguments, expectations about the moderating role of geographical 
proximity can be formulated. When geographical proximity is low, organisations with low levels 
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of niche overlap will be less likely to cooperate when located far apart. Information exchange 
challenges related to knowledge stickiness, and high coordination costs associated with 
geographical distance, will be exacerbated by the limited degree of resource similarity and 
reciprocal absorptive capacity, resulting in a low propensity to collaborate. Organizational 
commonalities will mitigate these disadvantages for partners with higher levels of niche overlap. 
Furthermore, the reduced competitive pressures experienced by distant partners will trigger 
cooperation. Niche overlap will increase the propensity of distant organizations to collaborate, up 
to a point. Extremely high levels of commonality in resource dependencies will likely exacerbate 
competitive constraints, despite the mitigating effect of distance. Hence, intermediate levels of 
niche overlap will most beneficially affect collaboration propensity among geographically distant 
partners.  
 When geographical proximity is high, collaboration is strongly favoured. This relation is 
especially true in the case of hospitals, for which the need to find a partner for joint problem-solving 
arrangements may favour the choice of a co-located rather than a distant partner. However, when 
geographical proximity is high, competitive constraints are also likely to be more pressing 
(KESSLER and MCCLELLAN, 2000; POUDER and JOHN, 1996), which should depress 
cooperative efforts. Due to the counteracting effects of collaborative and competitive drives, a 
nonlinear effect of niche overlap on propensity to collaborate is expected, as is the case for distant 
partners, albeit with a different strength due to the higher tendencies to both collaborate and 
compete. For low to moderate levels of niche overlap between co-located organizations, the 
possibility of enjoying complementarities might dominate over the however strong competitive 
pressures, and collaboration could be possible and desired. As niche overlap increases, the 
competitive pressures are likely to counteract cooperative benefits more strongly, thereby 
depressing the propensity to collaborate, which remains however high because of high geographical 
proximity.  
 Given these arguments, the following hypothesis can be made: 
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H2. Geographical proximity moderates the inverted U-shaped relationship between niche overlap 
and the propensity to collaborate, such that the magnitude of the effect of niche overlap on 
propensity to collaborate will be stronger for geographically distant organisations.  
  
RESEARCH DESIGN 
Institutional setting 
Empirical merits of the two hypotheses were tested by using data on patient-transfer relations 
collected within a community of hospital organizations in Lazio. This large Italian geographical 
region has a resident population of about five million inhabitants, more than 60% of whom live in 
the capital city of Rome. Patient transfers represent a key form of interhospital collaboration 
(IWASHYNA et al., 2009; LEE et al., 2011; LOMI et al., 2014; LOMI and PALLOTTI, 2012). 
Hospitals provide an ideal setting to examine the interdependencies of competitive and 
collaborative processes, because hospitals’ technical and institutional environments are 
inextricably interrelated (RUEF and SCOTT, 1998; SCOTT and MEYER, 1991[1983]). As 
organizations operating in a technical environment, hospitals are rewarded for the ‘effective and 
efficient control of their production system[s]’ (SCOTT and MEYER, 1991:123). As organizations 
operating in an institutional environment, they are subjected to ‘institutional rules and requirements 
to which they have to conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy’ (SCOTT and MEYER, 
1991:123). Owing to the interwoven nature of the institutional and technical environments, 
opportunities for competition and collaboration between hospitals can be understood only through 
the association of each with the other.  
 The regional health system in Lazio is part of the Italian National Health System (NHS). 
Established in 1978 following a model similar to the British NHS, the Italian NHS provides 
universal coverage through a single payer. The health budget is funded mainly by general tax 
revenues, especially income taxes. The 21 regions (similar to states in the U.S.) allocate resources 
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to approximately 200 Local Health Units (LHUs), local administrative units responsible for the 
organization and delivery of healthcare services to their resident populations. Organization of the 
regional health system in Lazio is entrusted to twelve LHUs. All of the geographical areas in the 
region are characterized by a homogeneous distribution of providers offering a broad range of 
services (Fig. 1). 
 
------------------------------------  
Insert Figure 1 about here  
------------------------------------ 
 
 The healthcare system in Lazio is characterized by a ‘quasi-market’ institutional 
framework, designed to sustain the equity benefits of traditional systems of public healthcare 
management and financing, while reaping the potential efficiency gains allowed by market 
competition (BARRETTA, 2008). This framework is the result of institutional reforms enacted in 
the 1990s with the purpose of improving the performances of single hospitals and the whole system. 
The institutional regime constructed through the introduction of managed care has progressively 
increased competition among healthcare providers. Owing to several characteristics (e.g. the 
obligations of hospitals to reach a financial equilibrium and of their Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs) to meet relative assessment criteria, the freedom for patients to choose their healthcare 
providers and the introduction of diagnosis-related groupings as the reimbursement system for 
services), this framework has required hospitals to attract greater numbers of patients from their 
local markets. The hybrid nature of this arrangement makes collaborative and competitive 
processes equally important for understanding the forces that shape the field in which hospitals 
operate (LOMI and PALLOTTI, 2012; MASCIA and DI VINCENZO, 2011; MASCIA et al., 
2012). Hospitals do compete for patients as their basic resource; however, they are also required to 
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coordinate their actions, operations and plans to serve the public interest and promote the patient’s 
health.  
 
Data 
The empirical part of this paper relies on both primary and secondary data sources. Primary data 
were collected through a questionnaire-based survey administered to all hospitals in Lazio. This 
survey was used to collect information about regional hospitals and their activities. Designed to 
elicit attributional information on individual healthcare providers, the questionnaire focused on four 
main themes: (i) Institutional typology of providers, (ii) Human resources employed, (iii) Range of 
services rendered and (iv) Structural resources available. A pilot questionnaire was pretested on 
five hospitals. Feedback received on the pilot questionnaire and the experience in administering it 
proved extremely valuable in designing the final version.  
 The questionnaire was administered by mail to the CEOs of all regional hospitals 
(excluding non-accredited private hospitals that are not entitled to a refund mechanism for patients 
from the NHS). The covering letter stressed that the purpose of the research was to provide baseline 
information; that hospitals would not be individually evaluated on their responses; and that a partial 
response to the questionnaire would be more useful than no response. Hospitals that did not respond 
during the first survey round were contacted, sometimes with several follow-up calls. At the end of 
this process, 91 (73%) organizations returned the questionnaire. 
 Secondary data were obtained from archival sources in the Hospital Information System 
(SIO) database. The SIO records and manages analytical information on every hospitalization event 
at every hospital in the region. The SIO releases yearly reports on admissions of patients in the 
hospitals, representing an important data source for epidemiology research and for the planning, 
production and assessment of healthcare services. The SIO database reports information on staffed 
beds, arranged by medical specialty and treatment type.  
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 The institutional forms of hospital organizations included in the sample are representative 
of the overall composition of institutional forms in the target population. As such, there is no reason 
to believe that certain organizational forms were systematically over- or undersampled. 
 
Variables and measures 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable of this study represents patient-transfer relations 
between hospitals in the sample. Although one of the most important forms of interhospital 
collaboration, patient transfers have only recently been investigated by research on 
interorganizational networks in healthcare (IWASHYNA et al., 2009; LEE et al., 2011; LOMI and 
PALLOTTI, 2012; LOMI et al., 2014; MASCIA et al., 2015; PALLOTTI et al., 2015). A patient 
transfer occurs when a hospital directly transfers one or more patients to another hospital during 
the same calendar day. To be sure, patient transfers are ostensibly intended to promote the patient’s 
health. A transfer may occur when a hospital has physical capacity constraints, or when the 
transferred patient has a pathology that can be treated more efficiently and effectively elsewhere 
(e.g. due to technological or clinical competence inadequacies). There are no exogenous constraints 
(i.e. legal constraints, superimposed models and structures, etc.) that limit the freedom of hospitals 
to choose recipients of patient transfer relations. In other words, hospitals may choose freely from 
any number of ‘receiver’ hospitals for the same patient. Patient transfers reflect underlying 
discretionary organizational decisions to involve a partner hospital in the search for a common 
solution to specific clinical and therapeutic problems (IWASHYNA et al., 2009). Patients are not 
transferred as a solution to contingent one-off problems. Rather, patient transfers occur in a highly 
structured social context that facilitates and actively promotes collaboration, communication and 
information sharing between sender and receiver hospitals (KITTS et al., 2013). Lack of adequate 
coordination between hospitals may have adverse consequences for transferred patients. Recent 
research has emphasized the relevance of interhospital patient transfers as an informal mechanism 
of integration in regional healthcare systems (IWASHYNA et al., 2009; MASCIA and DI 
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VINCENZO, 2011; MASCIA et al., 2012). The present analysis focuses specifically on the transfer 
of inpatients, defined as admitted patients who have consented to follow the clinical and therapeutic 
paths proposed by professional medical staff. Patients retain the right to refuse a transfer, but they 
cannot choose where they will be transferred.  
 On the basis of the SIO data for the year 2004, an adjacency socio-matrix (WASSERMAN 
and FAUST, 1994) of interhospital patient transfers was constructed. The matrix contains the 
hospital sending/receiving patients in each row/column, and the number of patients transferred from 
the ‘row hospital’ to the ‘column hospital’ in the intersection cells. Because the interorganizational 
network induced by patient transfer relations is asymmetric, the final sample consists of 8,190 
dyadic observations. Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the network of patient transfer 
relations. 
 
 ----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here  
------------------------------------ 
 
 Independent variables. The first independent variable of theoretical interest is similarity 
in resource dependence profiles. An accepted approach to operationalizing this variable involves 
measuring the Niche overlap among all possible pairs of organizations in a community (BAUM 
and SINGH, 1994; PODOLNY et al., 1996). Operational measures of niche overlap are context-
dependent (e.g. MCPHERSON, 1983) and may be defined with reference to various kinds of 
resource dependencies.  Prior research considered service offerings to be the most critical 
dimension of a hospital’s niche (SOHN, 2001; 2002; SUCCI et al., 1997). Competition between 
hospitals directly relates to the extent that they offer the same range of services. Patients generally 
consider two hospitals that provide a similar range of services as substitutable, which will result in 
an overall increased level of hospital competition. As emphasized by Sohn (2002, p. 464):  
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To detect true overlap, one needs to stratify patients into service groups that tend to be offered at the 
same hospital. This stratification scheme will allow one to detect correctly a competitive relationship 
that involves a small specialty hospital outcompeting a larger one in the narrow range of services 
the former specializes in. 
 Consistent with Sohn, niche overlap coefficients were computed by considering the types 
of services, or ‘service groups’, offered by each hospital. Operationally, niche overlap was 
measured by using Sohn’s (2001; 2002) relational measure, which was developed specifically for 
the analysis of competition between hospitals. This measure allows for asymmetric niche overlap. 
Given a generic pair of organizations i and j, two distinct measures of niche overlap, Cij and Cji, are 
computed, which measure the intensity of competition that i receives from j and that i produces 
toward j, respectively. As a starting point, the calculation of niche overlap coefficients considers a 
rectangular array of dimensions n × m, whose rows contain hospitals and columns contain 25 
hospital service categories, or Major Diagnostic Categories (MDCs). Once admitted to a hospital, 
a patient is routinely assigned an ICD9-CM code, which indicates his or her pathology. MDCs 
represent homogeneous groups of pathologies (i.e. groups of ICD9-CM codes) used by hospitals 
for reimbursement purposes. MDCs are internationally coded and formed by dividing all possible 
principal diagnoses into 25 mutually exclusive diagnosis groups (i.e. categories). For example, the 
category MDC4 identifies ‘Respiratory System’ and groups all pathologies that affect the 
respiratory system of patients.  
 Row vectors in the aforementioned array report the aggregate number of patients within 
each MDC. The amount of competition between two hospitals will be directly proportional to their 
similarity in patient admission patterns (e.g. two hospitals are competitors if they offer the same 
services to patients). The level of competition ijC  between hospitals i and j is computed as:  
 
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where min(xik, xjk) indicates the overlap (or ‘intersection’) in patient pools between hospitals i and 
j in MDC k; the numerator expresses the overall sum of niche overlaps between hospitals i and j 
across all MDCs k; and the denominator expresses the niche width of the i-th hospital (i.e. total 
number of patients admitted by hospital i across all MDCs).  
 The term min(xik, xjk) requires that Cij range between 0 (no overlap) and 1 (complete 
overlap). Thus, the dyadic niche overlap coefficient Cij may be interpreted as the overlapping 
proportion of the two hospitals’ patient pools. Calculating all niche overlap coefficients results in 
a one-mode matrix of size 91 × 91. Cells of this matrix indicate the amount of competition within 
each hospital dyad. Hospitals in dyads with a niche overlap coefficient close to 1 are exposed to 
strong competitive pressures, because they compete for the same pool of patients.  
 The second variable of theoretical interest is Geographical proximity, operationalized as 
the geographical distance (in kilometres) between each pair of hospitals. The distance is multiplied 
by -1 to reverse the scale so that larger numbers indicate higher proximity.  
 Control variables. The empirical model includes two groups of control variables – 
organization- and dyad-specific attributes – to account for factors that may confound the relation 
between niche overlap and the propensity of hospitals to collaborate. Control variables are 
described in detail in Appendix A. Table A1 in Appendix also reports descriptive statistics and 
first-order correlation coefficients of all the variables included in the empirical model specification. 
Table 1 provides definitions.  
  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 about here  
---------------------------------- 
 
Empirical model 
The empirical model adopted in this study takes the following form: 
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  exp)( ijijijijijijijijijijij XDRDRDRRYE   24432210  
 
where ij  is the expected number of patients that hospital i sends to hospital j; ijR  is the niche 
overlap between hospitals i and j; ijD  is the geographical proximity between hospitals i and j; 
ijij DR  and ijij DR
2
 are the two main interaction effects for testing the research hypotheses; ijX  
summarizes the effect of covariates in the model; and   ijexp  is an error term assumed to follow 
a Gamma distribution with unit mean. Negative binomial regression is implemented, with 
maximum likelihood estimation being used for the inferential task because the dependent variable 
takes the form of discrete counts (possibly including zero). 
 Because the data are dyadic, covariates representing continuous organization-specific 
variables (i.e. number of employees) enter the model specification as absolute differences between 
levels of the variable observed for ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ hospitals. The smaller the difference is, 
the more similar the hospitals are. When the difference is zero, hospitals are identical with respect 
to the specific attribute being considered. For covariates taking categorical values (i.e. LHU 
membership) and binary values (i.e. Level of care), an exact match is used to identify organizations 
in the same category. In this case, a zero value is interpreted as a measure of difference rather than 
similarity. Conversely, a value of one signals that members of a dyad share membership in the same 
category or are part of the same class. 
 One major concern with dyad-oriented observation schemes is that the observations are not 
independent; each actor in the network appears in multiple dyads, thus creating complex 
dependencies across observations. Consequently, the coefficient estimates will be consistent, but 
the standard errors may be estimated incorrectly. In empirical studies of interorganizational 
networks, this problem is typically alleviated by introducing a fixed effect for each source or 
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recipient of a relation (OWEN-SMITH and POWELL, 2004; REAGANS and MCEVILY, 2003). 
The same analytical strategy is applied for the results in the empirical part of the present paper. The 
estimation of fixed effects also controls for additional sources of heterogeneity among hospitals, 
which may affect the latent tendency of individual hospitals to send or receive patients.  
 
 
RESULTS 
Table 3 reports maximum likelihood estimates of the model specified in the previous section.  
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here  
----------------------------------- 
 
Models are reported in increasing order of completeness. In particular, Model 0 includes only the 
intercept and control variables. Model 1 adds the effect of niche overlap and its quadratic term to 
test the first research hypothesis. Model 2 introduces the geographical proximity variable. Model 3 
adds the moderating effect of geographical proximity, by introducing the first-order interaction 
between geographical proximity and niche overlap. Finally, Model 4 reports the full model, 
including the interaction between geographical proximity and the quadratic term of niche overlap.  
 Overall, the results support the research hypotheses. In Model 1, a significantly positive 
parameter for Niche overlap suggests that interorganizational collaboration increases with 
increasing similarity in resource dependence patterns. The significantly negative parameter of the 
quadratic effect of niche overlap (Niche overlap2) in Model 2 suggests that as niche overlap 
increases beyond a certain threshold, the effect of competition predominates and makes 
collaboration less likely. Taken together, these two effects confirm Hypothesis 1 by suggesting an 
inverted U-shaped relation between niche overlap and interhospital collaboration.  
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 In Model 2, the positive parameter associated with geographical proximity implies that 
hospitals are more likely to transfer patients across short distances. Model 3 provides evidence of 
a negative but weak moderating effect of geographical proximity on the relation between niche 
overlap and interhospital collaboration. Specifically, as geographical proximity increases, high 
levels of niche overlap reduce the propensity of hospitals to collaborate. Finally, Model 4 
documents a negative and significant parameter for the interaction effect of Niche overlap × Spatial 
proximity, as well as a positive and significant parameter for the interaction effect of Niche overlap2 
× Spatial proximity. 
 To interpret the results in Model 4 more intuitively, interhospital patient transfers and niche 
overlap coefficients are plotted for high and low geographical proximity (Fig. 3). 
 
----------------------------------  
Insert Figure 3 about here  
---------------------------------- 
 
High and low proximities are calculated by using the average geographical distance +/- 1 standard 
deviation as cut-off values.  
 For short-distance (i.e. high-proximity) hospital pairs, the effect of niche overlap on the 
propensity to collaborate is very mild, and is represented in Fig. 3 by a nearly flat curve. For long-
distance (i.e. low-proximity) hospital pairs, an inverted U-shaped relation between collaboration 
and niche overlap is more directly observable. As niche overlap increases, highly distant hospitals 
show a rapidly increasing propensity to collaborate up to a point, after which the effect of niche 
overlap dramatically depresses collaboration. Intersection of the two curves shows that for 
moderate levels of niche overlap, long-distance hospital pairs are more likely to collaborate than 
short-distance pairs. In contrast, for high or low levels of niche overlap, short-distance pairs are 
more likely to collaborate. Fig. 3 thus provides support for Hypothesis 2 and the moderating effect 
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of geographical proximity: the effect of niche overlap on the propensity to collaborate is much 
stronger in the case of low proximity than for high proximity hospitals.  
 Model 4 shows that the control variables are significant in the expected directions. Patients 
are more likely to be transferred between hospitals differing in size (positive Number of beds) and 
facing the same administrative constraints (same LHU membership). Hospitals tend to transfer 
patients to hospitals that are institutionally similar (positive Organizational form) or provide 
complementary services (positive Service complementarity). Hospitals are also more likely to 
transfer patients to hospitals with which they previously collaborated (positive Past collaboration). 
Consistent with intuition, hospitals are more likely to collaborate with hospitals offering different 
levels of care (negative Level of care) and with hospitals that are similar in available capacity, 
productivity, number of services offered and efficiency (negative Occupancy rate, Productivity, 
Scope of service and Average length of stay). Predicted effects of niche overlap and geographical 
proximity on the propensity of hospitals to collaborate are virtually unchanged after controlling for 
control covariates.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper explores the role of geographical proximity in moderating the relation between 
competitive interdependence (or niche overlap) and the propensity of organizations to collaborate 
and exchange resources. The main underlying assumption is that geographical proximity exerts a 
differentiated effect on two opposing factors affecting the propensity of organizations to 
collaborate: namely, cooperative opportunities and competitive constraints. Competitive forces 
trigger differentiation strategies, whereas institutional processes tend to induce interorganizational 
homophily, or isomorphism (DIMAGGIO and POWELL, 1983). The market structure emerges 
from the interaction between these two opposing forces. Consequently, it is important to understand 
how niche overlap affects the propensity of organizations to collaborate, as well as the extent to 
which geographical distance affects this relation. 
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 To address these issues, this paper proposes a model in which niche overlap has a nonlinear, 
inverted U-shaped effect on the propensity of organizations to collaborate. The geographical 
proximity of organizations moderates this relation, which appears as a markedly inverted U-shaped 
curve for long-distance hospital pairs and as a nearly flat curve for short-distance pairs. The effect 
is tested by using data on collaborative and competitive relations within a community of hospital 
organizations. The results provide insights into how different levels of geographical proximity 
affect the formation of collaborative relations between organizations.  
 This work builds on and extends prior literature on the relation between collaborative and 
competitive processes in interorganizational networks. One view suggests that similarity in 
resource dependence patterns, or niche overlap, increases the intensity of competitive 
interdependence between organizations (BAUM and HAVEMAN, 1997; FREEMAN and 
HANNAN, 1983). According to this perspective, the more two organizations depend on similar 
resources, the more intense their rivalry will be. An alternative viewpoint suggests that 
organizations depending on similar resources will become more similar along relevant structural 
and behavioural dimensions (DIMAGGIO and POWELL, 1983). However, similar organizations 
may find it easier, rather than more difficult, to interact. Hence, according to this second vision, the 
more two organizations depend on similar resources, the more likely they will be to collaborate 
(INGRAM and YUE, 2008; TRADIPO, 2007).  
 Taken together, these two theoretical viewpoints suggest that the same forces which 
increase competitive intensity between organizations also increase the possibility for mutual 
understanding and cooperation. This conclusion resonates with well-established empirical literature 
on mutual forbearance showing that dependence on common resources facilitates both competition 
and collaboration between organizations (BAKER and FAULKNER, 1993; LOMI and 
PALLOTTI, 2012). On the basis of these two apparently conflicting visions, this paper proposes 
and tests a unifying model suggesting the presence of a nonmonotonic relation between similarities 
in research dependence patterns and interorganizational collaboration. In addition, this paper 
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documents how geographical proximity interacts with niche overlap to increase the likelihood that 
‘friendly competition’ will become ‘vicious competition’ (PENG and BOURNE, 2009).  
 This work builds also on available empirical research in economic geography examining 
the relation between spatial and nonspatial proximity measures. In a seminal work, Boschma 
(BOSCHMA, 2005) moved beyond the strong emphasis on geographical proximity (e.g. 
AUDRETSCH and FELDMAN, 1996; GERTLER, 2003) to identify social, organizational, 
cognitive and institutional proximities as additional crucial factors affecting knowledge sharing 
between firms and innovation performance (also TORRE and GILLY, 2000). Since Boschma’s 
paper, numerous studies have tried to distinguish the influence of different proximity types on the 
behaviour of firms (BALLAND, 2012; FLEMING et al., 2007; MOLINA-MORALES et al., 2014), 
and particularly on their collaborative exchange relations (e.g. TER WAL, 2014). This paper 
matches and advances this nascent line of research. To the extent that niche overlap can be 
associated with shared language, common knowledge, norms and values – all of which represent 
important components of cognitive proximity (MOLINA-MORALES et al., 2014) – this paper 
confirms the results of empirical studies showing interaction between spatial (e.g. geographic) and 
nonspatial (e.g. cognitive) proximity types in predicting interorganizational exchange ties 
(HANSEN, 2014).  
 This study has one main practical implication, as it sheds light on the need for executives 
and administrators to consider both competitive interdependence and spatial proximity in the 
selection of the ‘right’ partners for exchange. For example, when attempting to integrate and 
coordinate with other hospital providers, managers should preferably look for geographically 
proximal hospitals that are not too similar in their resource dependence profiles (i.e. types of 
services rendered) or for geographically distant hospitals exhibiting intermediate levels of 
similarity.  
 At least three limitations need to be considered in the interpretation of the results. The first 
limitation is methodological. Dyadic network data are characterized by complex local 
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dependencies. In the empirical analysis, this paper statistically controls for such dependencies 
without actually identifying them. Advanced statistical methods for directly specifying local 
dependencies have been developed and applied to the study of interorganizational networks (LOMI 
and PATTISON, 2006). These methods should be used whenever specific local configurations of 
interorganizational network ties can be associated with theoretically motivated hypotheses about 
endogenous microprocesses of network formation.  
 The second limitation is theoretical. As organizations are embedded in a multidimensional 
resource space, the paired concepts of ‘niche’ and ‘niche overlap’ are multidimensional as well. 
Projecting these concepts onto a single dimension (i.e. similarity in the range of services rendered) 
clearly oversimplifies the complex nature of the environment in which hospitals operate. 
Furthermore, the emphasis placed on patients as the main source of competition and collaboration 
does not mean that patients are the only important resource for hospitals. Hospitals may collaborate 
in many other ways, such as through the mobility of managers and doctors, or through joint training 
programs for healthcare professionals. Observing all possible relations among organizations is a 
daunting task. Moreover, it is possible that not all observable relations are equally helpful in 
identifying organizations’ positions in meaningful resource spaces. A more balanced approach 
towards defining organizational niches should probably be based on a mixture of relational and 
nonrelational elements. The present study has only indirectly considered such elements by 
controlling for several organizational and institutional attributes at the individual-hospital and dyad 
levels.  
 The final limitation concerns the scope of the results. Hospital organizations have many 
idiosyncrasies and cannot be considered as representative of the organizational world at large. For 
example, hospitals operate in highly institutionalized environments, and their survival depends on 
their abilities to balance complex forms of legitimation granted by various normative external 
sources (RUEF and SCOTT, 1998). Hospitals face trade-offs between managerial principles of 
financial equilibrium and institutionalized principles of universal coverage and free access to 
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healthcare. These contextual features of hospital organizations may make the findings reported here 
hard to be found in different settings. Nevertheless, determining the effects of similarity in resource 
dependencies on the propensity of organizations to collaborate is an issue of general relevance that 
surpasses the specific competitive and institutional settings examined here. In this respect, the 
model proposed in this paper may easily find application and invite comparative research in 
different institutional contexts.   
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